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Abstract – The sovereignty of nations is highly dependent on the 
continuous and uninterrupted operation of critical infrastructures. 
Recent security incidents on SCADA networks show that threats 
in these environments are increasing in sophistication and number. 
To protect critical infrastructures against cyber attacks and to cope 
with their complexity, we advocate the application of a resilience 
strategy. This strategy provides the guidelines and processes to 
investigate and ensure the resilience of systems. In this abstract, 
we briefly refer to our definition of resilience, our research work 
on the verification of resilience policies, and our resilience archi-
tecture for protecting SCADA networks against cyber attacks. 
1. Introduction 
The protection of critical infrastructures (CIs) is of vital im-
portance – more than ever before – given the severity and impact 
resulting from any kind of disruption to services hosted by CIs. 
Systems and networks in such environments generally appear to 
be ill-prepared for the adverse consequences of cyber attacks. 
Also, the increased interconnection between enterprise and 
SCADA networks appear to elevate the likelihood for additional 
attack vectors and paths. Depending on the incentives of threat 
actors, the attacks may be characterised by a variable level of 
sophistication and consequences. For effective protection of CIs, 
we embrace resilience management, eliciting information from 
various viewpoints of a system, viz. Organisational, Technical and 
Individual – the so-called OTI viewpoints [1].  
1.1 Resilience Strategy 
To ensure the resilience of systems, we apply a strategy called 
‘D2R2+DR’ [2]. We define resilience as ‘the ability of a network 
or system to provide and maintain an acceptable level of service in 
the face of various faults and challenges to normal operation’ [2]. 
The steps in a two-loop process are: (inner loop) Defend against 
challenges to normal operation; Detect when an adverse event or 
condition has occurred; Remediate the effects of the adverse event 
or condition; Recover to original and normal operations; (and 
outer loop) Diagnose the fault that was the root cause; and Refine 
behaviour for the future based on past D2R2+DR cycles.  
1.2 Resilience Policies 
Access control offers mechanisms to control and limit the actions 
or operations that are performed by a user on a set of resources in 
a system. Nevertheless, considering only restriction of access may 
not be enough in some environments, such as in CIs. The protec-
tion of systems in this type of environment requires a new line of 
enquiry. It is essential to ensure that appropriate access is always 
possible, even when users and resources are subjected to challeng-
es of various sorts [3]. Resilience in access control is conceived as 
the ability of a system not to restrict, but rather to ensure access to 
resources. To fulfil this requirement, we have examined how 
attribute-based access control (ABAC) resilience policies can be 
specified in temporal logic and how these can be formally verified 
using automated model checking techniques. 
1.3 Resilience Architecture for SCADA Networks 
The increasing number of cyber attacks on CIs led us to the devel-
opment of a method to monitor, detect and evaluate anomalous 
behaviour within critical infrastructures in accordance with our 
D2R2+DR strategy, embedded within a risk assessment process. 
The approach we have adopted considers the OTI viewpoints and 
supports the detection of anomalies using appropriate techniques 
at the different levels of an infrastructure. The architecture is 
evaluated in the context of a European utility network, and by 
using publicly available SCADA network datasets. 
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